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RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE LAW
AFFECTING CONDOMINIUM AND
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS IN GEORGIA*
Seth G. Weissmant and Clara L. Fryertt
INTRODUCTION
The Georgia Condominium Act 1 (GCA or "the Act") is now ten
years old.2 It replaced the Apartment Ownership Act,' as a positive
means of regulating the development and operation of condomini-
ums in Georgia.4 As with all statutes, the passage of time has re-
vealed a need to strengthen and clarify existing provisions of the
Act and the need to provide additional regulation. This article,
therefore, will highlight some of those problems and recommend
solutions for them. In addition, the article will explore the need for
the regulation of other forms of common interest ownership com-
munities, 5 such as homeowners associations, in Georgia. While this
* Copyright 0 1985 Seth G. Weissman and Clara L. Fryer.
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1975; M.A. (City Planning), University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1978; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1979. Mr. Weiss-
man is a principal in the law firm of Hyatt & Rhoads, P.C.
tt B.A., Troy State University, 1980; J.D., University of Alabama, 1983. Ms. Fryer
is an associate in the law firm of Hyatt & Rhoads, P.C.
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-70 - 44-3-115 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
2. The GCA became effective October 1, 1975. 1975 Ga. Laws 609, 671.
3. GA. ConE ANN. §§ 85-1601b - 85-1625b (Harrison 1978).
4. See generally Hyman, The Georgia Condominium Act-Notes for the Practi-
tioner, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 168 (1977); Comment, The Georgia Condominium Act of 1975: A
Sound Basis for Innovative Condominium Practice, 24 EMORY L.J. 891 (1975).
5. The term "common interest ownership community" is derived from the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act, adopted at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Prefatory Note to that act
explains the creation of the concept as follows:
The explosive rise in land costs during the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with
the desire of many consumers to own housing and recreational amenities
which they could not afford except when owned with others, led to an
extraordinary development of various forms of shared or "common" own-
ership of real estate. The three most common forms of common ownership
have been condominiums, cooperatives and so-called "planned unit devel-
opments," or cluster housing projects. Each of these forms typically in-
cludes creation of a mandatory owners association to manage and main-
tain common amenities, while separate portions of the real estate-
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article does not advocate wholesale revisions or abandonment of
the GCA, it does propose fine tuning of the Act so that it can con-
tinue to serve a positive function for the next decade.
I. ASSOCIATION OPERATIONS
A. Assessment Collection
The GCA provides that all sums assessed by a condominium as-
sociation which are unpaid constitute a lien in favor of the associa-
tion. This lien is prior and superior to all liens except: (1) liens for
ad valorem taxes on the condominium unit; (2) the lien of any first
priority mortgage covering the unit and the lien of any mortgage
recorded prior to the recording of the declaration of condominium;
(3) the lessor's lien provided for in O.C.G.A. § 44-3-86; and (4) the
lien of any secondary purchase money mortgage covering the unit.7
The problem with this priority scheme is in the drafter's eleva-
tion of the priority of the "lien of any secondary purchase money
mortgage covering the unit."' This priority status is contrary to the
scheme established in the superseded Apartment Ownership Act
which afforded protection to the condominium association from
the secondary purchase money mortgagee's foreclosure.9 The
purchase money mortgage priority is not part of the Uniform Con-
dominium Act.10
units-are occupied for individual use.
Prefatory Note, UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP AcT, 7 U.LA 231 (1985).
6. See generally Hyatt, Condominium and Home Owner Associations: Formation
and Development, 24 EMORY L.J. 977 (1975).
7. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a) (1982).
8. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a)(4) (1982).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1621b (Harrison 1970) provided in pertinent part as follows:
Priority of lien - (a) All sums assessed by the Association of Apart-
ment Owners but unpaid for the share of the common expenses chargeable
to any apartment shall constitute a lien on such apartment prior and su-
perior to all other liens except only (i) ad valorem taxes, and (ii) all sums
unpaid on a first mortgage or deed to secure debt of record or (iii) rental
due under lease of the property to which the declaration is subject ....
(b) Where the mortgagee of a first mortgage of record or other pur-
chaser of an apartment obtains title to the apartment as a result of fore-
closure of the first mortgage, such acquirer of title, his successors and as-
signs, shall not be liable for the share of the common expenses or
assessments by the association of apartment owners chargeable to such
apartment which became due prior to the acquisition of title to such
apartment by such acquirer. (Emphasis added.)
10. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-116(b), 7 U.LA. 527 (1985). The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Condomin-
ium Act two years after Georgia enacted its condominium act. 7 U.LA 421 (1985).
[Vol. 1:185
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Purchase money mortgagees are, in principle, a protected class
in certain circumstances, such as those governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code.1 The wisdom of such protection, at the expense
of the condominium association, is doubtful since the purchase
money mortgagee is in a better position to protect himself than the
association.
With the aid of a secondary purchase money mortgage, a pur-
chaser may acquire a condominium unit with an assessment be-
yond that purchaser's financial means. A purchase money mortga-
gee (who is typically the owner/seller of the unit) may make a bad
credit calculation or apply unrealistic credit standards (which un-
fortunately happens with an anxious seller). Consequently, the as-
sessments which the purchaser owes to the association typically go
unpaid. Therefore, the association effectively subsidizes the main-
tenance, upkeep and insurance costs of preserving the unit. These
subsidies continue until the foreclosure of the secondary purchase
money lien. The unforeseen financial pressure of impending special
assessments or maintenance problems in the condominium may re-
quire payments beyond the means of the new owner. Ironically, it
is often an owner/seller's failure to disclose these assessments and
problems which may cause the new purchaser to become finan-
cially unable to pay the assessments; but it is inequitable to allow a
prior owner as secondary purchase money mortgagee to preempt
the association from collecting the assessments owed on the unit.
The prior owner had control and may even have created the situa-
tion leading to the financial insolvency.
This problem could be solved by amending the GCA to conform
to the principles codified in the Apartment Ownership Act and the
Uniform Condominium Act, by deleting O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a)(4).
In this way, an association's lien for unpaid assessments would be
prior and superior to the lien of a secondary purchase money mort-
gagee. Given that the purchase money mortgagee is in a better po-
sition to protect himself against loss than is the association, the
risk is more properly shifted to him.2
11. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312 (1978).
12. Judy & Wittie, Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues, 13 REAL PROP.,
& PROB. TR J. 437, 474-80 (1978).
Condominium unit owners are far more dependent upon each other for
the preservation and promotion of their interests than are either conven-
tional home owners or renters. This interdependence is particularly acute
with respect to the operating expenses which must be borne by each unit
owner . . .. [Ilf some unit owners do not pay their share of common ex-
penses, the burden of paying those shares may be shifted to other unit
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A similar issue is the GCA's complete and unlimited protection
of the first priority mortgage from the association's lien. Although
it is necessary to protect the security interest of the first mortgage
lender, it is also necessary to protect the association. 3 The associa-
tion must enforce collection of unpaid association fees and
assessments.
The Uniform Condominium Act strikes a balance between the
protection of the lender and the association. Section 3-116 of the
Uniform Condominium Act provides that the association's lien has
priority as to prior first mortgages for six months' assessments.14
This type of provision recognizes the following facts: (1) associa-
tions have a legal duty to provide for maintenance, upkeep and
insurance costs for the condominium;15 (2) assessment income is
generally the sole source of revenue most associations have to meet
their obligations; 6 (3) associations may be unable to meet their ob-
owners and may thereby substantially increase the obligations of those
other unit owners.
Id. at 474-75.
13. Unlike the secondary purchase money mortgagee who can control the terms of
the transaction and who chooses to be a creditor, the association is an involuntary
creditor.
In effect, the condominium is an involuntary creditor which becomes obli-
gated to advance services to unit owners in return for a promise of future
payment. Such advances are much like the loans made by a mortgagee
under an obligatory mortgage future advances clause, but with only the
most rudimentary controls upon the amount and timing of the loan ad-
vances, the terms of the loan, and the continuing creditworthiness of the
borrower. At the same time, the association is very much at the mercy of
its borrowers whose defaults could impair the association's financial
stability.
Id. at 475-76.
14. Specifically, § 3-116(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances
on a unit except (i) liens and encumbrances recorded before the recorda-
tion of the declaration, (ii) a first mortgage or deed of trust on the unit
recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced
became delinquent, and (iii) liens for real estate taxes and other govern-
mental assessments or charges against the unit. The lien is also prior to
the mortgages and deeds of trust described in clause (ii) above to the
extent of the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget
adopted by the association pursuant to Section 3-115(a) which would
have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 6 months im-
mediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien.
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-116(b), 7 U.L-A 527 (1985). (Emphasis added.) See also 68
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3315(b)(2) (Supp. 1985).
15. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-105, 44-3-107 (1982).
16. Weissman & Fryer, Representing Condominium Unit Purchasers, 21 GA. ST.
B.J. 6, 14 n.36 (1984).
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ligations without strong rights to collect assessments; and (4) if as-
sociations are unable to meet their obligations, fewer services can
be provided, property values may drop and higher assessments will
be required from those owners who are paying assessments.17 The
commentary to § 3-116 acknowledges that this provision is "[a] sig-
nificant departure from existing practice ... ."Is The commentary
anticipates that a lender will pay the assessment to protect its pri-
ority and then commence direct action against the owner. 9
An eventual downturn in the economy would result in a major
increase in foreclosures. The consideration of such a limited lien
protection is essential to the economic well-being of the association
community.20
B. Enforcement of the Condominium Documents
The GCA requires owners to comply with the condominium in-
struments, and gives the condominium association remedies to ad-
dress a lack of compliance, including the power to assess monetary
fines.2 The power to assess monetary fines is practical because it
allows an association to take an immediate, affirmative step to en-
courage compliance without resorting to litigation, which can be
both costly and protracted.22 In the condominium community, the
enforcers and violators are neighbors, and often the violations may
not justify judicial intervention. Thus, monetary fines are an ap-
propriate remedy.23
To regulate the association, the enforcement section of the GCA
provides that "[e]very unit owner. . . shall comply with all lawful
17. The nonpayment of association fees can create a ripple effect. Judy & Wittie
characterized this phenomenon:
The impact of nonpayment of assessments for common expenses goes be-
yond the resultant increase in costs which may be incurred by the other
unit owners. . . . [C]ontinuing non-payments may threaten the viability
of the condominium itself, forcing down property values within and, con-
ceivably, around the condominium. This, in turn, affects the interests not
only of unit owners but of mortgage lenders and, less directly, of the im-
mediate community.
Judy & Wittie, supra note 12, at 475.
18. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-116 comment 2, 7 U.LA 528 (1985).
19. Id.
20. See Judy & Wittie, supra note 12, at 481-83.
21. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-76 (1982).
22. See generally Scavo, Dispute Resolution in a Community Association, 17 URB.
L. ANN. 295, 308 (1979). (In most cases, litigation is inappropriate given the minor
nature of the violations.)
23. Id. at 315.
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provisions of the condominium instruments . . . . [T]o the extent
provided in the declaration, the association shall be empowered to
impose and assess fines and suspend temporarily the right of use
of certain of the common elements in order to enforce such compli-
ance . ... "24 The problem lies in the term "condominium instru-
ments" which is defined in the GCA to include the declaration of
condominium, but not the by-laws of the condominium association
or rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto.2 5 The rules may
contain substantial restrictions affecting the use of the condomin-
ium property, 2 and the by-laws may regulate the operation of the
condominium association. 7 As a result, a gray area exists as to
whether the power to impose monetary fines or employ other en-
forcement remedies applies to violations of the by-laws and rules.
Associations may be able to circumvent this potential problem
by providing in the declaration that the power to impose fines ex-
tends to violations of the by-laws and rules;28 but this section of
the GCA would be clearer if it specifically required compliance
with the declaration, by-laws and any rules and regulations
adopted pursuant thereto. The drafters of the Uniform Condomin-
ium Act took this approach and gave condominium associations
the power to impose "reasonable fines for violations of the declara-
tion, bylaws, and rules and regulations of the association .
C. Allocation of Liabilities for Common Expenses
The provisions allocating common expenses are among the most
complicated in the GCA. Generally, an association must annually
determine a budget encompassing all of the common expenses of
the association." The condominium instruments will either pro-
vide that unit owners pay common expenses on an equal basis or
on a formula basis where larger units pay a greater share of the
common expenses than smaller units. Normally, the common ex-
penses under this formula are allocated based on the percentage of
24. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-76 (1982).
25. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(8) (Supp. 1985).
26. See, e.g., Beachwood Villas Condominum v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). (A board of directors has authority to adopt rules governing and
restricting the use and rental of units, when the rules do not contravene the
declaration.)
27. Hyatt, Community Associations: How to Draft Documents That Work, 7 REAL
EST. L.J. 26, 31-32 (1978).
28. See Hyatt, supra note 6, at 1002.
29. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-102(a)(11), 7 U.L.A. 502 (1985).
30. See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-80(c) (1982).
[Vol. 1:185
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ownership interest that each owner has in the common elements.
The GCA provides that the association will allocate common ex-
penses according to "the allocation of liability for common ex-
penses set forth in the declaration."31
As a practical matter, many common expenses may not benefit
owners on an equal basis or on a standard formula basis related to
the percentage of ownership interest in the common elements.3 2
The GCA contains a provision which was intended to enable as-
sociations to allocate assessments on something other than an
equal or assigned percentage basis.33 It allows common expenses
benefiting less than all of the units to be assessed equitably among
all of the units which are benefited. This provision of the GCA,
when incorporated into the condominium instruments, allows a
condominium association to assess common expenses in a manner
other than a standard division of the expenses among all unit own-
ers, in accordance with an allocation set forth in the declaration of
condominium.
The problem with this section of the GCA is that there is no
standard to apply to determine the type of common expense which
"benefit[s] less than all of the units '34 or which "significantly dis-
proportionately benefit[s] all of the units."3 5 Condominium as-
sociations which attempt to assess common expenses according to
the degree they specifically benefit the owners quickly discover
that all common expenses arguably benefit some owners more than
others and are, therefore, capable of special division. Once the pre-
31. Id.
32. Examples of such varying expenses include: utility usage, if provided by the as-
sociation; cable television usage; and repair of limited common elements, such as decks
or patios, which may differ in type and configuration from unit to unit.
33. Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 44-3-80(b) (1982) provides:
(b) To the extent that the condominium instruments expressly so
provide:
(1) Any other common expenses benefiting less than all of the units
shall be specially assessed equitably among all of the condominium
units so benefited ....
(3) Any other common expenses significantly disproportionately
benefiting all of the units shall be assessed equitably among all of
the condominium units.
In addition, O.C.G.A. § 44-3-80(c) (1982) provides "the amount of all common ex-
penses not specially assessed pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section...
shall be assessed against the condominium units in accordance with the allocation of
liability for common expenses set forth in the declaration ... "
34. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-80(b)(1) (1982).
35. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-80(b)(3) (1982).
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cedent is established, associations can find themselves under pres-
sure to specially assess all expenses.38 Administratively, this cre-
ates a bizarre method of expense allocation in which every unit has
a different assessed fee. More importantly, such a scheme destroys
the concept of a condominium as a place where common expenses
are shared.3 7
As a result, many condominium associations have avoided allo-
cating expenses under this section of the Act, choosing instead to
live with the inequalities that may arguably exist. The solution to
the problems with the special assessments allowed by O.C.G.A.
§ 44-3-80(b)(1) and (3) is to provide a statutory standard which
defines how the sections should be applied. One possible solution
would be to bar special assessments for the cost of maintaining,
repairing or replacing any item which the association has the re-
sponsibility to maintain. Normally, the association is responsible
for the maintenance of the common elements (and exterior build-
ing surfaces if not a part of the common elements) but not for
maintenance of limited common elements and/or the interiors of
the units.38 Since all unit owners own an undivided interest in the
common elements, a restriction should be applied to O.C.G.A.
§ 44-3-80(b)(1) and (3) which will apportion common element
maintenance costs in accordance with ownership interest. This re-
sult is equitable.
Associations should continue to be allowed to allocate the costs
of maintaining the limited common elements on a "benefiting less
than all" basis. This is reasonable because limited common ele-
ments are by definition portions of the condominium reserved to
36. An example of something which "benefit[s] less than all of the units" is the
situation where there is one building in a six building complex with a bad roof, and the
association decides to specially assess the cost of repairing the roof against only the
owners in the building with the bad roof.
The problem is compounded when the corollary principle of specially assessing an
expense which "significantly disproportionately benefit[s]" all of the units is applied
because of the difficulty in reasonably determining the degree to which an expense
"significantly disproportionately benefit[s]" those units. For example, what is the dis-
proportionate benefit of repairing a bad roof to the owners of units on the top floor
where a leak is occurring, versus the owners of units on the bottom floor of the same
building who are only indirectly affected by the bad roof? Similarly, what is the dis-
proportionate benefit of replacing a shrub located directly outside of one building, but
which is viewed by owners in other buildings?
37. Once the costs of maintaining one roof are specially assessed, there is no rational
basis for not specially assessing the costs of maintaining all of the other roofs, or main-
taining all of the other gutters, siding, doors, walkways and landscaping to the point
where no maintenance costs are shared among all of the units.
38. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 44-3-105 (1982).
[Vol. 1:185
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the exclusive use of less than all of the unit owners. 39 The common
expenses associated with their maintenance can be readily allo-
cated to or among the owner or owners to whom the limited com-
mon element is assigned. In many instances, different units have
different limited common elements. For example, some units may
have limited common element balconies, while others may not.
Therefore, if less than all of the units in a condominium had balco-
nies, those balconies could logically be assigned as limited common
elements. Allocating the cost of maintaining the limited common
elements on a "benefiting less than all" basis would allow the asso-
ciation to specially assess the cost of maintaining the balconies
only to those units which have them.
If the statute is so amended, common expenses which could
thereafter be specially assessed would largely be limited to items
which had been assigned as limited common elements. These spe-
cially assessed items could also include utility services, such as
water, gas and electric, as well as other services, such as cable tele-
vision and trash pick-up. An amendment such as this would more
precisely implement what was originally intended by the drafters
of the Act.4 0
D. Assignment and Reassignment of Limited Common
Elements
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82 deals with the assignment and reassignment
of limited common elements. No portion of the common elements
can be assigned as limited common elements unless the assignment
is specifically permitted by the terms of the declaration.41 Limited
common elements typically include such things as doorsteps, bal-
conies, patios and, on occasion, assigned parking spaces.42 The
GCA, however, does not clearly define who must consent to the
assignment and reassignment of a limited common element.
With respect to a reassignment of a limited common element,
the GCA provides that "[tihe [reassigning] amendment shall be-
come effective when the association and the unit owners of the
units whose use of the limited common element is or may be di-
rectly affected by the reassignment have executed and recorded
39. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(19) (Supp. 1985).
40. See Atlanta Const., Feb. 27, 1975, at 17-A, col. 1 (remarks of J. Clifton Barlow,
an author of the Act).
41. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82 (1982).
42. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASsoCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY Asso-
CIATION LAw, 28-29 (1981).
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the same."'4 3 With respect to an initial assignment of a limited
common element not previously assigned by the declaration, the
GCA provides that "[t]he amendment shall be delivered to the
unit owner or owners directly affected by the assignment upon
payment by them of all reasonable costs for the preparation, exe-
cution, and recordation thereof."'4
The problem with these subsections is twofold. First, it is un-
clear who is "directly affected" by the assignment or reassignment
of a limited common element. For example, if the association ini-
tially assigns a parking space to a unit as a limited common ele-
ment, the better argument is that such an assignment directly af-
fects only the unit to which the parking space is assigned.
However, it can also be argued that all owners are directly affected
since a portion of the common elements in which all owners share
an undivided interest is no longer available to the general use. The
use of "directly affected" language implies that less than all of the
owners are required to approve an initial assignment or reassign-
ment of a limited common element.45 This ambiguity could be
eliminated by clarifying the term "directly affected." The way to
do this is to require that an initial assignment of a limited common
element must be approved by the association and by the unit
owner to whom it is being assigned. A reassignment of a limited
common element should require the additional approval of the
owner(s) from whom it is being taken.
Clarifying this provision would make it easier to assign portions
of the common elements not previously assigned and to reassign
existing limited common elements. Unit owners will be protected
because limited common elements cannot be assigned to or taken
away from an owner without his or her permission. 6 Moreover, the
owner is protected with respect to third party assignments of lim-
ited common elements because the declaration gives notice as to
portions of the common elements which may be assigned as limited
common elements.47
The association also would benefit from such a restriction. By
43. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82(b) (1982).
44. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82(c) (1982).
45. Presumably, the "directly affected" language means less than all because if the
drafters meant all of the units owners they would have specified such number. For
example, O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93(a) requires that two-thirds of the unit owners approve
amendments to the condominium instruments, unless the instruments themselves call
for a larger majority. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93(a) (1982).
46. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82(a) (1982).
47. See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82(c) (1982).
194 [Vol. 1:185
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limiting the approval of an assignment of a limited common ele-
ment to the owner to whom it is assigned, such assignments now
become feasible. For example, if an association wants to assign
parking spaces on a complex-wide basis, at the present time, one
owner could attempt to veto the entire parking assignment scheme
arguing that he or she is directly affected by the assignments. With
a change in the language of O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82 such an argument
would be moot.
The second problem is determining what is meant by the terms
"association" and "amendment" in O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82. The associ-
ation is required to execute an amendment to assign or reassign a
limited common element. Presumably, the term "association"
means the board of directors acting on behalf of the association as
is suggested in the language of O.G.C.A. § 44-3-106. 48 The term
"board of directors" is also specifically indicated in other sections
of the GCA, 4' but the term "association" is used in assigning lim-
ited common elements. Moreover, the amendment to assign a lim-
ited common element, which must be recorded, is presumably min-
isterial in nature. The amendment is not one which must be
approved by the unit owners in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-3-
93. The section on limited common elements is silent on this point.
Both of these ambiguities could be clarified by specifically pro-
viding that the board of directors on behalf of the association may
execute an amendment to assign or reassign a limited common ele-
ment. Further, such an amendment should not need approval by
the unit owners in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93. Thus, the
assignments of limited common elements would not need the ap-
proval of at least two-thirds of the votes in the association.
48. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(b) (1982) provides:
Any third party dealing with the association shall be entitled to rely in
good faith upon a certified resolution of the board of directors of the asso-
ciation authorizing any such act or transaction as conclusive evidence of
the authority and power of the association so to act and of full compliance
with all restraints, conditions, and limitations, if any, upon the exercise of
such authority and power. (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, the obligatory language used in O.C.G.A. § 44-3-82(b) (1982), "[tlhe
association shall ... execute," does not appear to contemplate a democratic consent
procedure. Therefore, it can be argued that a consent procedure involving the owners
is a paper consent because the association is required to execute the consent by the
Act.
49. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 44-3-91(c) (1982).
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E. Amendment Procedure
The GCA addresses the amendment of condominium instru-
ments by providing that "[e]xcept to the extent expressly permit-
ted or required by other provisions of this article, the condomin-
ium instruments shall be amended only by the agreement of unit
owners of units to which two-thirds of the votes in the association
pertain or such larger majority as the condominium instruments
may specify . . . .,5 Many condominium instruments in Georgia
are being written with amendment requirements which far exceed
the minimum requirements.
The authors of this article, for example, have reviewed several
sets of condominium instruments which required approval of 90%
or 100% of all unit owners and first mortgagees to amend the in-
strument. This stringent amendment procedure makes it difficult,
if not impossible, to amend a set of condominium instruments.
Practical experience in representing condominium associations
tells us that due to apathy and differences of opinion, it is almost
impossible to get 90% or 100% of the unit owners and mortgagees
to agree on anything.5 1 Moreover, whenever a substantial number
of mortgagees must approve an amendment, the only sure way to
determine who the mortgagees are is to do a full title search on
every unit.5 2 The cost of the title searches adds a tremendous bur-
den to an already difficult process of amending the condominium
instruments.
A condominium is in reality a quasi-government which exercises
broad powers over an owner's right to use his or her unit and the
common elements.5 3 The condominium instruments are, in effect,
the laws of the quasi-government; they prescribe the rights, re-
50. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93(a) (1982).
51. Recently, the authors were involved with a condominium association which was
forced, unsuccessfully, to seek 100% owner and 90% mortgagee approval to try to
remove an unpopular provision from the declaration which required that cats be on a
leash.
52. Such a requirement is even more burdensome because many of the lenders who
make loans on the condominium will sell the underlying paper in the secondary mort-
gage market. Therefore, contacting the various lenders ultimately needed for consent
is a major undertaking in itself. Given that the initial lender will often continue to
service the loan, the average owner is unaware of the true mortgagee on the property.
Thus, unless specifically contemplated in the documents, an informal survey of owners
to determine mortgagees cannot always be relied upon.
53. Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
CHI. L. RE v. 253 (1976); see also Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d
180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). (A restriction on the use of alcoholic beverages in a
clubhouse was held to be reasonable.)
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sponsibilities and restrictions which apply to the association and
unit owners. A fledgling political science student would agree that
a government in perpetuity with laws which are not subject to sup-
plementation or alteration cannot meet the changing needs and
circumstances of the times. Thus, such laws are not established on
a solid foundation. Yet just such a result is dictated when impossi-
ble amendment requirements are part of the condominium
instruments. 54
A solution to this problem would be to revise the present amend-
ment language to set an upper limit on the percentage of unit own-
ers and mortgagees needed to amend the condominium instru-
ments. For example, the pertinent part of O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93(a)
could be expanded to provide:
Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other
provisions of this article, the condominium instruments shall
be amended only by the agreement of unit owners of units to
which two-thirds of the votes in the association pertain or such
larger majority as the condominium instruments may specify,
provided such majority does not exceed the owners and mort-
gagees of units to which three-fourths of the votes in the asso-
ciation pertain .
Such an amendment should not affect developer rights,55 or the
financing of condominium units, 56 but should insure the flexibility
needed to allow an association to meet its changing needs.
Another needed change is addition of a requirement that a chal-
lenge to the validity of an amendment adopted by the association
must be brought within one year of the recording of the amend-
ment. This would eliminate the problem of an association having
54. There is some precedent in Georgia for a court to reform and modify in equity
an unworkable declaration of condominium. See Selby v. Gilmer, 240 Ga. 241, 240
S.E.2d 80 (1977).
55. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-93(a) (1982) would continue as follows:
[pirovided, however, that during any such time as there shall exist an
unexpired option to add any additional property to the condominium or
during any such time as the declarant has the right to control the associa-
tion pursuant to Code Section 44-3-101, the agreement shall be that of the
declarant and the unit owners of units to which two-thirds of the votes in
the association pertain, exclusive of any vote or votes appurtenant to any
unit or units then owned by the declarant, or . . . subject to the limita-
tions in this Code section... a larger majority as the condominium in-
struments may specify. (Emphasis added.)
56. Mortgagee rights are protected in various other provisions of the Act and would
remain unaffected. See Comment, The Georgia Condominium Act of 1975: A Sound
Basis for Innovative Condominium Practice, 24 EMoRY L.J. 891, 899-900 (1975).
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to prove that an amendment was validly adopted years after the
fact. Often, the owners who originally adopted the amendment
have moved from the complex, and the records establishing the
validity of the amendment may have been lost or destroyed. The
Uniform Condominium Act contains clear language in this regard
and gives condominium associations a greater degree of certainty
in enforcing and operating pursuant to the condominium instru-
ments.5"
F. Notice of Meetings
The GCA requires that notice of annual meetings be given to
each owner at least twenty-one days in advance of any annual
meeting, and at least seven days in advance of any other meeting.58
The Act further requires that the notice "be delivered personally
or sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, to all unit owners
of record . . . .59 It is unclear, however, whether the notice must
be sent or received before the seven or twenty-one days specified
in the statute.
The Uniform Condominium Act resolves this ambiguity by spe-
cific provision; the proper officer of the association "shall cause no-
tice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail
. . .-6 within a specified period of time before the meeting. In
other words, the notice is valid if it is sent within the specified
time period. The adoption of such a provision would eliminate the
potential argument regarding the sufficiency of notice which pres-
ently exists in the GCA.
G. Architectural Changes
The GCA gives the association, except to the extent prohibited
by the condominium instruments, the power to approve or disap-
prove architectural changes to the exterior of units.8 1 Specifically,
the association is authorized to:
[g]rant or withhold approval of any action by one or more unit
owners or other persons entitled to occupancy of any unit if
such action would change the exterior appearance of any unit
57. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 2-117(b), 7 U.L-A 482 (1985).
58. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-102 (1982).
59. Id.
60. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-108, 7 U.LA 515 (1985).
61. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(a)(3) (1982).
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or of any other portion of the condominium or elect or provide
for the appointment of an architectural control committee to
grant or withhold such approval.62
It is unclear whether this section of the GCA gives an association
the power to permit architectural changes which encroach upon
the common elements in a material way.
In a condominium, all unit owners possess an undivided interest
in the common elements.63 Additionally, most condominium in-
struments give unit owners a specific easement right to use and
enjoy the common elements. A troublesome issue is whether the
association's statutory authority to permit architectural changes
includes the power to permit changes which arguably constitute a
taking of the common elements or which infringe upon the existing
easement rights of the other unit owners. This issue was the focal
point of the Ohio case of Grimes v. Moreland.""
In Grimes, a condominium association approved an amendment
of the condominium documents by a seventy-five percent vote of
the unit owners. The amendment allowed individual owners to in-
stall fences and air conditioning compressors upon the common el-
ements.65 The court, however, ruled that the placing of fences and
air conditioning compressors on the common elements constituted
a taking of property because it ousted the unit owners from a per-
centage of their undivided interest in common areas; 66 and the
court concluded that a unanimous vote of the membership of the
association was required to amend the condominium documents in
that manner.67
In contrast, two strong arguments support the notion that draft-
ers of the GCA contemplated an association having the power to
permit encroachments upon the common elements. First, almost
any architectural change will extend beyond the strict legal bound-
aries of the unit and encroach upon or take some portion of the
common elements; but the GCA gives the association the power to
permit changes to the exterior of units.6 '
The second argument centers on the broad power to grant ease-
62. Id.
63. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(7), (9) (Supp. 1985).
64. 41 Ohio Misc. 69, 322 N.E.2d 699 (Common Pleas Ct. 1974).
65. Id. at 73-74, 322 N.E.2d at 700-01.
66. Id. at 74-75, 322 N.E.2d at 702.
67. Id., 322 N.E.2d at 703.
68. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(a)(3) (1982).
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ments which the GCA expressly confers upon an association.6 ' The
power to convey an easement can also be used to permit the kind
of architectural changes which the Grimes court found to be tak-
ings or encroachments. However, the Act's provisions for architec-
tural changes would be much clearer if O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106 were
amended to expressly give the condominium association the power
to approve actions by unit owners which change the exterior ap-
pearance of a unit or any other portion of the condominium. These
owner actions would include those which encroach upon the com-
mon elements; but such an amendment should also specify that
the association cannot grant approval of any change which en-
croaches upon the common elements or is deemed to alter the
boundaries of any unit, unless the association also complies with
all of the Act's requirements for redefining unit boundaries.70
From a policy viewpoint, allowing an association to permit archi-
tectural changes which encroach on the common elements is desir-
able. The unit owners will be allowed to make improvements that
enhance the enjoyment and the value of their units, such as adding
or extending a deck or patio, while the association will continue to
regulate the size, type, design and quality of encroaching architec-
tural changes. 71 Thus, the owners have the right to make improve-
ments to their units while remaining protected against potential
unsightly changes or other abuses which might occur in the ab-
sence of regulation.
H. Granting Licenses and Entering into Leases
The GCA gives the association the power to convey easements
over the common elements,72 but the Act does not give the associa-
tion the companion powers to grant licenses or enter into leases
with respect to portions of the common elements. These powers,
however, are afforded condominium associations under the Uni-
form Condominium Act7" and would greatly benefit association op-
erations. These powers would provide associations with a means of
giving owners and others use rights over portions of the common
69. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(b) (1982).
70. See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-91 (1982).
71. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(a) (1982).
72. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(b) (1982).
73. The Uniform Condominium Act provides "[eixcept as provided in subsection
(b), and subject to the provisions of the declaration, the association . . . may . ..
grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions through or over the common ele-
ments." UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-102(a)(9), 7 UJL.A. 502 (1985).
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elements without having to convey an interest in the property.
Having the power to grant a license or enter into a lease could be
helpful in several situations. For example, the association might
want to lease or license the clubhouse, swimming pool or a portion
thereof to an owner for a party; it might want to license the revo-
cable assignment of parking spaces; it might want to lease a por-
tion of a clubhouse for a concession stand or office; or it might
want to lease a room for the placement of washing machines and
dryers. While these powers may be implied from the theories of
general corporate law, it would be beneficial to expressly provide
for them in the GCA.
L Association Insurance
The responsibility of the association to obtain proper insurance
coverage is a crucial function. To protect their substantial interest
in the property, lenders and unit owners rely on the board of direc-
tors to obtain insurance. Unfortunately, the GCA does not provide
adequate minimum requirements which define how insurance poli-
cies must be structured in order to achieve the desired level of
protection.74
As a practical matter, insurance policies must be tailored to the
condominium concept in several respects to prevent over or under
insurance for property and liability protection. The GCA currently
provides:
The Association shall obtain:
(1) A casualty insurance policy or policies affording fire
and extended coverage insurance for and in an amount
consonant with the full replacement value of all struc-
tures within the condominium ....
(2) A liability insurance policy or policies, in amounts
specified by the condominium instruments but not in
amounts less than $500,000.00 for injury, including death,
to a single person; $1,000,000.00 for injury or injuries, in-
cluding death, arising out of a single occurrence; and
$50,000.00 for property damage. The policy or policies
shall cover the association, the board of directors and the
officers of the association, all agents and employees of the
association, and all unit owners and other persons enti-
tled to occupy any unit or other portion of the condomin-
ium .... 75
74. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-107 (1982).
75. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 1 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 201 1984-1985
17
Weissman: Recommended Changes in the Law Affecting Condominium and Homeowne
Published by Reading Room, 1985
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Many decisions as to the type and extent of insurance coverage
needed by an association should be addressed in the statute as a
legislative requirement. Some insurance policy distinctions, how-
ever, should be required by law. For example, the Uniform Condo-
minium Act clearly provides that the association's liability insur-
ance for the protection of unit owners covers death, bodily injury
and property damage "arising out of or in connection with the use,
ownership, or maintenance of the common elements. 7 This is in
contrast to the GCA which provides no such limitation and simply
requires that the association obtain liability insurance covering the
unit owner.77 The broad language of the GCA could be construed
to require liability coverage of the owner for injuries occurring in-
side the owner's unit even though the association has no present
means to protect against risk inside the owner's unit.
For example, if an owner maintained a dangerous condition in-
side his unit, an invitee could be injured as a result of the condi-
tion. Under the language of the GCA, it could be argued that the
association's insurance policy must indemnify the owner. The lan-
guage of the GCA should, therefore, be amended to conform to the
requirements of the Uniform Condominium Act with one addition.
In its current configuration, the Uniform Condominium Act re-
quires that the association maintain liability coverage for injuries
arising out of the use of the common elements;7 8 but an association
will often maintain portions of a unit which are not common ele-
ments. Therefore, the langauge should be broadened slightly; the
coverage should include injuries "arising out of or in connection
with the common elements and other portions of the condominium
which the association is responsible for maintaining. '7 9
Additionally, the Uniform Condominium Act requires that an
association policy contain the following provisions: (1) each unit
owner is an insured person under the policy with respect to liabil-
ity arising out of his interest in the common elements or member-
ship in the association; (2) the insurer waives its right to subroga-
tion under the policy against any unit owner or member of his
household; (3) no act or omission by any unit owner, unless acting
within the scope of his authority on behalf of the association, will
void the policy or be a condition to recovery under the policy; and
(4) if, at the time of a loss under the policy, there is other insur-
76. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-113(a)(2), 7 U.L.A. 521 (1985).
77. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-107(2) (1982).
78. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AT § 3-113(a)(2), 7 U.LA 521 (1985).
79. See id.
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ance in the name of a unit owner covering the same risk covered by
the policy, the association's policy provides primary insurance.80
Although most policies designed by the insurance industry for
condominium associations fulfill the above requirements, there are
still a number of policies which do not incorporate these needed
provisions. Moreover, the reasoning behind these provisions is
sound.
Requiring that each unit owner be an insured person under the
insurance policy means that the owner will be protected against
liability, a requirement of the GCA. Mandating that the insurer
waive its right to subrogate against the unit owner ensures that the
insurance which is statutorily required to protect the unit owner is
in place. After all, it is that owner, by virtue of his or her assess-
ment, who has purchased the insurance for protection from the
risk of loss. If the association were the only "insured" under the
policy, the insurer could theoretically subrogate the "claim" of the
association against a negligent unit owner for damages from which
he or she has purchased protection.81
The provisions of the Uniform Condominium Act also provide
protection for the association from unit owner misconduct which
might otherwise negate coverage for the entire community; 2 and
the language of the Uniform Condominium Act makes it clear that
the association's policy must be primary coverage and not supple-
mental coverage with respect to the unit owner's policy.8" Adding
similar language to the GCA would only serve to strenghten its
protection for condominium owners and associations.
J. Leasing Restrictions
A major issue facing homeowners within many condominium
communities is the question of how to deal with the leasing of
units within the condominium. Associations have experienced
problems in four major areas as a result of the leasing of condo-
minium units: absentee ownership, the attitudes and behavior of
some renters, the number of persons leasing units and require-
ments for financing and insurance.
The problems which can arise because of substantial absentee
80. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-113(d), 7 U.LA 521 (1985).
81. See generally Community Association Insurance, 4 COMMUNITY A. INST. GUIDE
FOR A. PRAC. 7301.
82. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AT § 3-113(d)(3), 7 U.L.A. 521 (1985).
83. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AT § 3-113(d)(4), 7 U.LA 521 (1985).
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ownership are of primary concern. When a large number of unit
owners stop residing at the condominium, their interest in the day-
to-day affairs of the condominium association often declines. This
is particularly true in the case of investment owners; and as the
number of renters increases and the number of resident owners de-
creases, some associations find that it becomes more difficult to
muster a dedicated and active group of owners to contribute to
those projects and programs which enhance both the financial
value of the condominium and its character as a place to live.
The second concern is the attitudes and behavior of some rent-
ers. Many owners perceive renters to have a different degree of
commitment to the condominium community because the renters
lack a financial stake in the community and usually reside within
the community for a much shorter period of time. The owners'
concern with commitment is normally articulated in several ways:
they feel that they have a greater interest in the appearance of the
units they occupy; they have a greater consideration for their
neighbors; and they have a greater interest in maintaining compli-
ance with the condominium instruments and rules and regula-
tions."4 These perceptions vary from one condominium to another
and, of course, may not be evident in every case.
The third concern relates to the number of persons who are
renting units. Often, the sheer number of persons leasing units ex-
pands in an uncontrolled manner. The facilities of the condomin-
ium are then spread beyond the capacity for which they were
designed. This typically creates parking problems and overcrowded
recreational facilities; and when the number of renters is excessive,
the condominium begins to resemble an apartment complex.85 As a
result, the resident owners feel that their community is too transi-
tory to establish a stable neighborhood, and are concerned with the
improvement of the community's living conditions and property
values.
Finally, if the condominium is not substantially owner-occupied,
problems can arise when financing and insurance are obtained.
Some lenders become hesitant to loan money for condominium re-
sales if a condominium is not substantially owner-occupied. 6 Simi-
larly, some insurance companies use the level of rental occupancy
in a complex as a criterion in determining coverage or premium
84. Mercer & Rogers, State of the Law on Occupancy and Use Restrictions (pt. 2),
COMMUNITY ASSN. L. REP., Mar. 1982, at 1, 2.
85. Id. at 2-3.
86. Id. at 3.
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Often, lender reluctance has been caused by guidelines regarding
the number of owner-occupied units imposed by the secondary
mortgage market.8  These guidelines were designed to make the
condominium a safe investment. Presently, there are no prohibi-
tive maximum caps on the level of leasing within projects; 9 but
secondary mortgage market entities such as the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC - "Freddie Mac") and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA - "Fannie Mae")
continue to distinguish between projects based on the level of
rental occupancy.90 This distinction, in turn, causes many primary
lenders to be concerned when rental occupancy substantially ex-
ceeds thirty percent because of the primary lenders' desire to sell
their mortgages in the secondary market.91
Because of these concerns, many associations in Georgia have
acted to amend their documents to more carefully regulate the
leasing of units and the behavior of tenants. Some associations
have prohibited the leasing of units altogether except in cases of
undue hardship of an owner.
Although courts in other jurisdictions have upheld a condomin-
ium association's right to regulate and prohibit leasing,92 there is
87. Id.
88. In the past, the major secondary mortgage market entities had criteria for which
they would purchase loan paper only in projects that were substantially owner-occu-
pied. The guidelines imposed a cap of 20, 25, or 30% on the level of rental units.
During the recession in the 1970s, this meant for many condominium sellers and pur-
chasers that money was not available for financing since the local lender was reluctant
to finance ultimately knowing it could not sell the paper in the secondary market.
See id.
89. See FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, PROJECT GUIDEBOOK: PROJECT APPROVAL
PROCEDURES, SOUTHEASTERN REGION, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (Feb.
1, 1984).
90. For example, FNMA distinguishes between a "Principal Residence/Second
Home Project" and an "Investment Project" as follows:
Principal Residence/Second Home Project. A project in which 70% or
more of the units are principal residences and second homes.
Investment Projects. A project in which less than 70% of the units are
principal residences/second homes (i.e., a project in which more than 30%
of the units are investment properties).
Id. at 24.
91. See Mercer & Rogers, supra note 84, at 2-3.
92. See, e.g., Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Kroop v. Cara-
velle Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Board of Managers
of Village House v. Frazier, 81 A.D.2d 760, 439 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979),
aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 991, 434 N.E.2d 257, 449 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1982); LeFebvre v. Osterndorf,
87 Wis. 2d 525, 275 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
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no Georgia case on the subject. The landmark case in this area,
Seagate Condominium Association, Inc. v. Duffy, 93 upheld an as-
sociation's amendment prohibiting leasing except in limited, hard-
ship cases.94 In Seagate, the Florida Court of Appeals addressed its
response to the issue as follows:
Given the unique problems of condominimum living in general
* . . [the association's] avowed objective - to inhibit trans-
ciency and to impart a certain degree of continuity of residence
and a residential character to their community - is, we believe
a reasonable one. . . . The attainment of this community goal
outweighs the social value of retaining for the individual unit
owner the absolutely unqualified right to dispose of his prop-
erty in any way and for such duration or purpose as he alone so
desires.95
In addition, the legislature in at least one state has clarified its
condominium statute so that the association has the authority to
file an action for damages or an injunction against a tenant for
the violation of the association declaration, by-laws, rules and
regulations."'
Arguably, associations in Georgia can continue to regulate and
restrict leasing without enabling legislation. Amending the GCA,
however, would help end much of the controversy currently sur-
rounding the efforts of associations to control leasing. The legisla-
tion could also ensure that leasing restrictions are not adopted
without the support of a majority of the condominium community;
and any such legislation should specify that an association can only
regulate or restrict leasing to the extent permitted in the condo-
minium instruments.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Standing
The GCA gives a condominium association the power to sue in
its own name to enforce the terms and provisions of the condomin-
ium instruments.97 Additionally, the Act requires that an associa-
tion must be sued as party defendant for torts occurring on the
93. 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
94. Id. at 485.
95. Id. at 486-87.
96. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.23 (Page 1981).
97. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-76 (1982).
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common area;98 but the Act is silent as to a condominium associa-
tion's standing to sue in its own name to recover for damages to
the common area (or other areas the association is responsible for
maintaining) which do not involve violations of the condominium
instruments. The most common claim of this type involves dam-
ages caused by construction defects, which, due to the uncertainty
in this area, developers frequently defend not on the merits but on
procedural grounds by raising the question of standing.
The only reported Georgia case in this area is Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States v. Tinsley Mill Village.99
In that case, an unincorporated condominium association was or-
ganized pursuant to the Apartment Ownership Act'00 and sought
money damages from a developer for the negligent construction of
certain drainage culverts. 1° 1 The condominium unit owners were
responsible for maintaining the culverts pursuant to easement
rights, and the association brought an action on their behalf.10 2 In
its defense, the developer argued that the association lacked stand-
ing because it did not own the injured property and as such was
not the real party in interest under the Georgia Civil Practice
Act.10 3 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the developer and
held the right to bring the claim belonged to the condominium
owners who owned the property.10 4
Initially, the holding in Tinsley Mill Village appears to bar a
condominium association from asserting a claim on behalf of its
members because it lacks standing. However, the effect of the case
on an association organized under the GCA is unsettled. The su-
preme court's opinion focused on the fact that the plaintiff was an
unincorporated association organized under the Apartment Owner-
ship Act;10 5 but the GCA, which superseded the Apartment Owner-
ship Act,106 requires that a condominium association be incorpo-
rated. 10 7 The act of incorporation gives an association the specific
98. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(g) (1982).
99. 249 Ga. 769, 294 S.E.2d 495 (1982).
100. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601b - 85-1625b (Harrison 1978).
101. 249 Ga. at 770, 294 S.E.2d at 496.
102. Id. at 770-71, 294 S.E.2d at 496.
103. Id. at 771, 294 S.E.2d at 497 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-117 which is now
codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) (Supp. 1985)).
104. Id. at 772, 294 S.E.2d at 498.
105. The court stated that "[w]e note that the Association has not incorporated pur-
suant to the Georgia Condominium Act.... ." Id.
106. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601b - 85-1625b (Harrison 1978).
107. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-100 (1982).
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power to sue or be sued and to complain and defend in all
courts.108 The mere act of incorporation, however, should not be
dispositive because it goes more to the capacity to sue rather than
determining who is the real party in interest.109
A condominium association established and incorporated pursu-
ant to the GCA must be a real party in interest because the Act
charges it with obligations to the unit owners and grants it powers
and duties with respect to damaged condominium property." 0 In
addition, the declarations of condominium for most associations
organized under the GCA provide that the association shall make
all repairs to the common area."' In contrast, the Apartment Own-
ership Act was virtually silent as to an association's powers and
interests in the property and with respect to the rights of the asso-
108. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-21(a)(3)(C), 44-3-21(a)(3)(C), 44-3-100 (1982).
109. Considering the statutory power of an unincorporated homeowner's association
to maintain suit on behalf of its members, the Georgia Supreme Court in Tinsley Mill
Village stated that "[t]his section [of the Code] merely provides that an unincorpo-
rated association has the capacity to sue... [but] a party may have the capacity to
sue without being the real party in interest." 249 Ga. at 772, 294 S.E.2d at 497 (Cita-
tions omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
110. The GCA establishes in the condominium association interests in the condo-
minium property. For example, O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(a) (1982) provides that the associ-
ation has the power to:
(2) Make or cause to be made additional improvements on and as a
part of the common elements; and...
(3) Grant or withhold approval of any action by one or more unit own-
ers or other persons entitled to occupancy of any unit if such action would
change the exterior appearance of any unit or of any other portion of the
condominium or elect or provide for the appointment of an architectural
control committee to grant or withhold such approval .... (Emphasis
added.)
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-106(b) also provides:
[TJhe association shall have the irrevocable power, as attorney in fact on
behalf of all unit owners and their successors in title, to grant easements
through or over the common elements, to accept easements benefiting the
condominium or any portion thereof, and to acquire or lease property in
the name of the association as nominee for all unit owners. . . and own in
its own name property of any nature, real, personal, or mixed, tangible
or intangible to borrow money; and to pledge, mortgage, or hypothecate
all or any portion of the property of the association for any lawful pur-
pose within the association's inherent or expressly granted powers. (Em-
phasis added.)
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-105 (1982) provides "all powers and responsibilities with regard to
maintenance, repair, renovation, restoration, and replacement shall pertain to the
association in the case of common elements. . ." and O.C.G.A. § 44-3-94 (Supp. 1985)
requires the association to restore any unit in the event of damage or destruction "un-
less otherwise provided in the condominium instruments." (Emphasis added.)
111. Weissman & Fryer, supra note 16, at 7; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-3-105 (1982);
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-102(a)(6), 7 U.LA 502 (1985).
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ciation for damages to the condominium property." 2
Clearly, the provisions of the Act (and most declarations of con-
dominium) charge an association with obligations and powers re-
garding the common area; but these provisions are only viable if
the association has the right to sue to protect its interests and re-
cover for damages to those interests. This approach is now gaining
support from courts in other jurisdictions." 3 For these reasons, the
holding in Tinsley Mill Village should not apply to condominium
associations organized under the GCA. In the former, the unincor-
porated association sued in a purely representative capacity; in the
latter, the association has rights and obligations in and to the dam-
aged condominium property.
The standing issue could be completely clarified by amending
the GCA to pattern it after the Uniform Condominium Act, which
gives the association the power to "institute, defend, or intervene
in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name on be-
half of itself or 2 or more unit owners on matters affecting the con-
dominium."' 14 If such an amendment were adopted, a condomin-
ium association would clearly have the power to recover damages
to portions of the condominium which it is financially responsible
to repair. Additionally, the adoption would eliminate any undue
burden on the individual condominium owners who might other-
wise have to pursue claims on their own. Finally, adopting the lan-
guage of the Uniform Condominium Act would help ensure that
claims against developers involving the common elements are han-
dled equitably and decided by a fair hearing on the merits, rather
than becoming bogged down in procedural issues involving who has
standing to sue.
112. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601b - 85-1625b (Harrison 1978); see also Com-
ment, supra note 56, at 897.
113. Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Hill Dev. Corp., 35 Conn. Supp.
199, 404 A.2d 131 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Avila South Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v.
Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Briarcliffe W. Townhouse Owners Ass'n v.
Wiseman Constr. Co., 118 II. App. 3d 163, 454 N.E.2d 363 (1983), reh'g denied, 134 Ill.
App. 3d 402, 480 N.E.2d 833 (1985); Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assoc., 93 N.J. 370, 461
A.2d 568 (1983); 1000 Grandview Ass'n v. Mt. Washington Assoc., 290 Pa. Super. 365,
434 A.2d 796 (1981); Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n Management Comm. v. Gibbons
Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983); cf. Dockside Ass'n, Inc. v. Detyens, Simmons
and Carlisle, 330 S.E.2d 537 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985). (A nonprofit corporation which man-
aged common elements of a condominium was held not to be a real party in interest
because it did not own the common elements in its own name and no statute existed to
give it standing.)
114. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-102(a)(4), 7 ULA 502 (1985).
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B. Statute of Limitations Periods
The GCA gives purchasers substantial rights if they reasonably
rely upon false or misleading statements published by the seller.11
Specifically, the Act provides:
Any person who, in reasonable reliance upon any false or mis-
leading material statement or information published by or
under authority from the seller in advertising and promotional
materials, including, but not limited to, the items required to
be furnished by this Code section, brochures, and newspaper
advertising, or who, without having been furnished with all of
the information required to be furnished by this Code section,
pays anything of value toward the purchase of a condominium
unit located in this state shall be entitled to bring an action
against the seller for damages .... 111
This provision particularly benefits consumers because the prevail-
ing party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 1
The Act requires, however, that the purchaser file the cause of
action within one year of the date that the last of any of the fol-
lowing events occurs:
(1) the closing of the transaction;
(2) the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for the
building containing the unit; or
(3) the date the common elements and any recrea-
tional facilities are completed."'
The problem is that the statute of limitations provided in the Act
is too short and effectively bars most claims from being brought.
The problem is particularly acute when the claim involves the
common elements or other portions of the condominium which the
association is obligated to maintain.
As a practical matter, most condominium unit owners do not
turn their attention to defects in the common elements during the
statute of limitations period; nor do they believe it is necessary to
address such problems until the declarant has turned control of
the association over to them." 9 Moreover, turnovers usually occur
115. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-111(i) (Supp. 1985) (This Code section does not apply to
resales.)
116. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-111(i) (Supp. 1985).
117. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-1110) (Supp. 1985).
118. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-111(i) (Supp. 1985).
119. Developers are often advised not to address problems which concern construc-
tion defects until after control of the condominium association has been turned over to
210 [Vol. 1:185
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close to or after the one-year statute of limitations has run; and
the owners are then left with little or no time to evaluate the com-
mon elements for defects or to bring a cause of action for such
defects under the GCA.120
This problem can be solved easily by adding the date upon
which the declarant turns over control of the condominium associ-
ation to the unit owners as an additional event from which to mea-
sure the one-year statute of limitations in the Act. Owners can
then evaluate and pursue claims relative to the common elements
upon taking control of the association, and they can do so without
the time pressures they currently face.
Under the current law, there is also some question as to whether
it is legitimate for fewer than all of the unit owners to recover
100% of the cost of repairing a defect in the common elements.12'
The inclusion of the proposed revision to the statute of limitations
will eliminate this concern.
C. Limitations on Exculpatory Clauses
Drafters of condominium instruments are including exculpatory
clauses in the more obscure sections of their condominium instru-
ments at an alarming frequency. Typically, these clauses attempt
to limit the declarant's liability with respect to the construction or
sale of condominium units and prevent the condominium associa-
tion and the individual unit owners from asserting claims on behalf
of themselves or each other.2 2 Arguably, such restrictions are void
the unit owners. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS - A GUIDE TO
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS § 10.20 (1985).
120. Id.
121. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Tinsley Mill Village, 219 Ga.
769, 291 S.E.2d 195 (1982). (The result in Tinsley Mill Village suggests this result.)
122. See, e.g., Declaration of Condominium for the Oaks of Dunwoody, A Condo-
minium, Fulton County, Georgia (available at the Clerk's Office, Superior Court,
Fulton County, Georgia, Deed Book No. 8269, at 315) art. IX, § 9.06:
§ 9.06 Right of Action. Each Owner hereby acknowledges and agrees
that the Association shall not be entitled to institute any legal action
against anyone on behalf of any or all of the Unit Owners which is based
on any alleged defect in any Unit or the common elements, or any damage
allegedly sustained by any Unit Owner by reason thereof, but rather, that
all such actions shall be instituted by the Unit Owners owning such Units
or served by such common elements or allegedly sustaining such damage.
See also, Declaration of the Ponce Condominium, Fulton County, Georgia (available at
the Clerk's Office, Superior Court, Fulton County, Georgia, Deed Book No. 8237, at
150) § 10.07:
§ 10.07 Acceptance of Improvements. Each Unit Owner hereby ac-
knowledges and agrees that Declarant shall not be liable for any defects in
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as against public policy under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b);123 but even if
the clauses do not affect the actual rights of condominium owners,
they can have a chilling effect on the perception which condomin-
ium unit owners have of their rights. Moreover, there is no case
law in Georgia directly on point which involves condominium
instruments.
The interests of Georgia's condominium unit owners could be
better served by amending the GCA to expressly void exculpatory
clauses of this type. The needed amendment could prospectively
prohibit the inclusion of such restrictions in condominium instru-
ments, articles of incorporation and by-laws.
III. REGULATION OF HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS
A housing development which includes a homeowner's associa-
tion (HOA) is prevalent in Georgia today. It is an alternative to
development under the condominium regime.124 Unlike the condo-
minium which was created by statute,12 5 the HOA is largely a
product of the Planned Unit Development (PUD) concept. Histori-
cally, the PUD was a zoning device used by local authorities to
allow cluster housing to be built at a greater density than the same
land would support if single family homes were built on individual
any Owner's Unit, any Limited Common Elements or any Common Ele-
ments, or damages resulting therefrom. Further, each Unit Owner hereby
acknowledges and agrees that the Association shall not be entitled to in-
stitute any legal action or seek any damages or redress whatsoever against
the Declarant, or any past, present, or future partner, employee or agent
of the Declarant, or any corporation or other entity, controlling, controlled
by or under common control with the Declarant (an "Affiliate") or any
such shareholder, officer, director, employee or agent of any such Affiliate,
on behalf of any or all of the Unit Owners which is based upon any alleged
defect in any Unit Owner's Unit or the Common Elements, or any damage
allegedly sustained by any Unit Owner by reason thereof.
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 639 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.
1981). (Contracts relating to the construction or maintenance of buildings which pur-
port to limit the liability of a contractor are in derrogation of the common-law rule
and should be strictly construed.)
124. An HOA can take many forms including, but not limited to, conventional sub-
divisions, attached housing and cluster housing. See generally, Hyatt, supra note 6, at
980.
125. The first statute providing for the creation of condominiums in the United
States was adopted in Puerto Rico in 1958. The Federal Housing Administration
model condominium statute was promulgated in 1962. Since that time, all states have
adopted at least a "first generation" of laws designed to govern the creation of condo-
miniums. Development of the Act, UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP AcT, 7 U.L.A.
231, 232 (1985).
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lots. 126 Nevertheless, the existence of mandatory HOAs and the use
of them by developers to maintain, repair, insure and manage
housing developments have made today's HOA largely indistin-
guishable from a condominium; 12 7 and with regard to the associa-
tion which governs the community, the issues and needs of a con-
dominium development and an HOA development are identical.128
Despite its similar purpose, an association of homeowners oper-
ating as an HOA cannot rely on the statutory framework of the
GCA for guidance or authority. The GCA does not apply to HOAs
for two reasons. First, the developer in creating the condominium
association must specifically submit the property to the GCA by
"record[ing the] condominium instruments pursuant to [the
Act]. ' '129 Secondly, and more importantly, the GCA specifies that
"[n]o property shall be deemed to be a condominium within the
meaning of [the Act] unless undivided interests in common ele-
ments are vested in the unit owners." 30 In an HOA, the title to the
common area is held in the name of the homeowners association
instead of being vested in the unit owners as tenants in common. 3'
Since the HOA is made up of all the individual owners in the com-
munity, this distinction is largely technical. 32
While HOAs in Georgia derive their powers from a declaration of
covenants, conditions and restrictions (hereinafter CC&R) which is
recorded at the beginning of the project, the ability of an HOA to
enforce the provisions of the CC&R depends on Georgia common
law governing covenants which "run with the land."' 33 A CC&R
declaration may be identical to a declaration of condominium, but
an HOA must rely on common law arguments which consider
whether a covenant "touches and concerns the land" or is designed
to preserve a "common sense" rather than following a modern stat-
utory scheme of shared ownership and responsibility. 3 4
On a national level, the National Conference of Commissioners
126. Id.
127. Id. See also Hyatt, supra note 6, at 980-81.
128. Development of the Act, supra note 125, at 233 (1985).
129. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-71(7) (Supp. 1985).
130. Id.
131. HYATr, supra note 42, at 13.
132. See Hyatt, supra note 6, at 980-81.
133. See Development of the Act, supra note 125, at 233.
134. Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 256 S.E.2d 357 (1979); Antill v. Sigman,
240 Ga. 511, 241 S.E.2d 254 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); City of Atlanta v.
Jones, 135 Ga. 377, 69 S.E. 571 (1910); Tift v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry., 103 Ga. 580, 30
S.E. 266 (1898); see generally cases collected in Jackson v. Rogers, 205 Ga. 581, 54
S.E.2d 132 (1949).
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on Uniform State Laws has recognized that this gap in the statu-
tory regulation of PUDs exists. The Commissioners' initial re-
sponse was the Uniform Planned Community Act which was
adopted in 1980.135 Since then, the Commissioners have promul-
gated an all-encompassing regulatory scheme which recognizes the
fact that condominiums, PUDs and cooperatives' 36 are three tech-
nically distinct entities with the same common theme; in all three
forms, "the beneficial interest in both the common elements and
the units lies with the unit owners, while management of the com-
mon elements is performed by the association.' 37 This statute,
which was adopted in 1982, is the Uniform Common Interest Own-
ership Act (UCIOA). ' s
Because of the practical similarities of PUDs, cooperatives and
condominiums, one act should regulate the development, sale and
operation of such "common interest communities." The UCIOA
parallels the Uniform Condominium Act," 9 with only slight modi-
fications beyond the "definition"'140 and "applicability""' portions
of the Uniform Condominium Act. As a result, states which have
adopted the Uniform Condominium Act can easily adopt the
UCIOA.
The GCA, however, is not based on the Uniform Condominium
Act.142 Therefore, Georgia cannot adopt UCIOA without rejecting a
135. Development of the Act, supra note 125, at 232.
136. "'Cooperative' means a common interest community in which the real estate is
owned by an association, each of whose members is entitled by virtue of his ownership
interest in the association to exclusive possession of a unit." UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(10), 7 U.L. 241 (1985).
137. Prefatory Note, supra note 5.
138. Id.
139. The Underlying Concept of UCIOA, UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT,
7 U.L.A. 235-36 (1985).
140. See generally UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103, 7 U.LI 240
(1985), and compare with UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 1-103, 7 U.LA 433 (1985). The
most important definition added to the UCIOA was § 1-103(7):
"Common interest community" means real estate with respect to which
a person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for real
estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement of other
real estate described in a declaration. "Ownership of a unit" does not in-
clude holding a leasehold interest of less than [20] years in a unit, includ-
ing renewal options.
UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNNERSHIP AcT § 1-103(7), 7 U.L.A. 240 (1985).
141. Compare the UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT, art. 1, pt. I, 7 U.L.A.
264-72 (1985), with the UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 1-102, 7 U.L.A. 428 (1985).
142. The GCA was adopted in 1975. See 1975 Ga. Laws 609, 671. The Uniform Con-
dominium Act was approved at the annual meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in Vail, Colorado in August 1977. See Prefatory
214 [Vol. 1:185
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statutory framework which has been in place in Georgia for the
past decade. For this reason, UCIOA is not an acceptable solution
to the problems facing HOAs in Georgia.
Instead, Georgia's legislature must determine the degree of regu-
lation which is needed to provide structure and certainty to the
creation and sale of units within PUDs and the powers and duties
of HOAs. The legislature must then consider its response to this
problem. For example, it could propose a separate act to govern
HOAs or it could amend the GCA to make it applicable to HOAs.
The latter approach adopts the principle underlying the UCIOA
and has the attractive advantage of utilizing legislation with which
Georgia's attorneys and courts are already familiar.
Regardless of the form of the selected solution, Georgia's
lawmakers should consider immediate action in three critical areas.
First, the legislature must reassess the twenty-year statutory limi-
tation on the duration of covenants 4 3 as it applies to the CC&R
which regulate the operation of an HOA. Specifically, O.C.G.A.
§ 44-5-60 provides that in any municipality or county having a
zoning ordinance, restrictive covenants may run with the land for
only twenty years. The intent of this limitation is to ensure that
land is not unduly burdened for indefinite periods of time.144
While the intent of this twenty-year limitation makes sense in a
traditional real estate context, it works an extreme hardship on an
HOA. In an HOA, the owners live in close proximity to one an-
other and share the ownership, use and maintenance of common
property through an association to which all belong. Under
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60, the covenants which create these communities
and give them the means to operate would be eliminated at the
end of a twenty-year period.
HOAs in Georgia presently own, maintain, insure and operate
roads, greenbelts and recreational facilities for the benefit of the
Note, UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT, 7 U.LA 421-23 (1985).
143. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (1982).
144. See Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 249 Ga. 276, 290 S.E.2d 94 (1982).
It is the general rule that the owner of land has the right to use it for any
lawful purpose, and restrictions upon its use must be . . . strictly con-
strued ..
Underlying this rule is the sound policy that land use must be governed
by its present owners, and should be subjected only in severely restricted
circumstances to control by former owners. Were this not the law, any
whim and caprice, once set down by deed, could diminish or destroy the
utility of real property for fully two decades. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 278, 290 S.E.2d at 96.
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lot owners. If O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60 is not amended at the end of
twenty years, HOAs will lose their power to impose assessments to
discharge their duties. They will be unable to enforce covenants
designed to preserve the peace and tranquility of owners living in
close proximity to one another and sharing the use of common
property. In many cases, the result will be that little or no organ-
ized maintenance of the common property will take place. Large
decreases in property values will likely follow; and eventually,
some type of forced intervention by a local unit of government or
the courts may become necessary. The CC&R bind the community
and provide the HOA with the apparatus to govern it. It follows,
therefore, that the nature and complexity of these communities de-
mand that the CC&R have perpetual duration.
On balance, arguments can be made that the restrictions in the
CC&R will continue to exist beyond the twenty-year limitation by
virtue of their being connected to easement rights.145 Arguments
can also be made that the covenants can legally provide for their
being automatically renewed. 14 The better approach, however, is
to provide a statutory basis which allows for the perpetual exis-
tence of covenants in communities of this type.
Many HOAs in Georgia are nearing their twentieth year of oper-
ation. Most lot owners and lenders are not yet aware of the exis-
tence of the twenty-year limitation. Therefore, the need for imme-
diate legislative action is clear.
The second issue is whether to grant HOAs the same assessment
lien collection powers which the GCA currently affords to condo-
minium associations. As with condominium associations, assess-
ments are, by and large, the sole source of available funds for
HOAs to meet their financial obligations.
The legal effect of an HOA lien for an unpaid assessment in
Georgia is not clear. In Country Green Village One Owner's Asso-
145. Hendley v. Overstreet, 253 Ga. 136, 318 S.E.2d 54 (1984); Lowry v. Norris Lake
Shores Dev. Corp., 231 Ga. 549, 203 S.E.2d 171 (1974); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v.
Georgia, Ashburn, Sylvester & Camilla Ry. Co., 91 Ga. App. 698, 87 S.E.2d 92 (1955).
(In most HOAs, the association holds legal title to the common area with each owner
having an easement right to use and enjoy such property subject to certain
restrictions.)
146. Many CC&R provide that the covenants will be renewed automatically for suc-
cessive periods of ten years unless some super-majority of the lot owners vote not to
renew the covenants. Precedent exists in Georgia, however, which suggests that cove-
nants which purport to extend beyond the twenty-year statutory limitation period will
be limited in duration to twenty years. See Antill v. Sigman, 240 Ga. 511, 241 S.E.2d
254 (1978).
216 [Vol. 1:185
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ciation, Inc. v. Meyers, 47 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
an HOA lien was neither a valid statutory nor common law lien. 14 8
In dicta, the court explained that if the association's lien was any-
thing it was an equitable lien; but the validity of the lien as an
equitable lien could not be decided in Country Green because the
original action had been brought in a court which lacked equity
jurisdiction. 49 Thus, while an HOA lien for an unpaid assessment
is arguably an equitable lien, the legal precedent which supports
this conclusion has not been established in Georgia.
By contrast, the GCA provides a condominium association with
a statutory lien which arises automatically when an assessment is
due and unpaid and which does not require recordation for no-
tice. 150 With limited exceptions,'"' the GCA condominium associa-
tion's lien is, by statute, prior and superior to all other liens. Fur-
thermore, the GCA provides for the addition of late fees, interest
and reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred. 52 An HOA, how-
ever, may be forced to pursue the collection of its liens subject to a
statutory limitation on its recoupment of attorney's fees ex-
pended. 153 When an HOA's ability to collect attorney's fees is lim-
ited by the statute to fifteen percent of the principal amount due,
the costs of collection will often exceed the amounts collected be-
cause of the small principal amounts owed in most cases.
The ability of an HOA to collect assessments is critical to the
operation and maintenance of the property. Therefore, the legisla-
ture should consider an immediate expansion of the GCA to make
O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-80 and 44-3-109 applicable to HOAs.
Finally, the legislature should consider giving HOAs the same
power to assess monetary fines that presently exists for condomin-
ium associations.15 4 This could be accomplished by making
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-76 apply to HOAs. As stated earlier in this article,
the power to assess monetary fines is among the most practical
remedies available to an association to enforce covenants. 55 Hav-
ing this power will allow an HOA to take an immediate and affir-
mative step to encourage compliance with the CC&R without hav-
147. 158 Ga. App. 609, 281 S.E.2d 346 (1981).
148. Id. at 610-11, 281 S.E.2d at 348-49.
149. Id. at 612, 281 S.E.2d at 349.
150. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a) (1982).
151. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a)(1) - (4) (1982).
152. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(b) (1982).
153. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 (1982).
154. O.C.G.A. § 44-3-76 (1982).
155. See text accompanying notes 20-28.
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ing to resort to litigation which can be both costly and protracted.
While this is a power typically given to the HOA within the terms
of the CC&R, it would be clearer if applied by statutory law
and would ease the operation of the HOA. As such, it is the
remedy most frequently used by condominium associations for
enforcement.1
56
The above suggestions are minimum legal protections which
should be afforded HOAs in Georgia. The legislature should addi-
tionally focus its attention on such matters as developer disclosure
and consumer protection for purchasers of homes in HOAs. As pro-
tections for consumers under the GCA are refined, as is suggested
by this article, there will be an increased incentive for developers
to avoid development under the GCA in favor of development in
some other, currently nonregulated format. With this potential for
avoiding consumer protection guidelines available, the Georgia leg-
islature needs to begin its discussion of the entire area of HOA
regulation immediately.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intent of this article has been to highlight problem areas in
the Georgia Condominium Act and explore whether regulation of
other forms of common interest ownership communities would be
helpful. There may be disagreements on whether this article raised
all of the changes needed in the Act and even whether all of the
changes recommended in this article are needed. The authors hope
that it will serve as a framework to let the much needed legislative
debate in this area begin.
156. Id.
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